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MAXIMUS AND MODERN 
PSYCHOLOGY 
········································································································ 
MICHAEL BAKKER 
PsYCHOLOGY as a science started to develop in the West when Maximus was still rela-
tively unknown. There are some analogies that are worth exploring, even though the~e 
is no evidence of any significant influence of his thinking on modern psychology. In th1s 
chapter the following two parallels will be treated: (1) that between Maximus' ascetic 
teachings and cognitive therapy and (2) that between his view of the soul and depth 
psychology. 
By way of introduction, let us turn to Maxim us' letter to George the prefect of the 
province of Africa, the first of his epistles according to the numbering of the PG. After 
comparing his friend to nothing less than the sun, Maxim us remarks that virtue is a mat-
ter of intention ( yvWflf]) rather than rank, and imitation of God a matter of disposition 
(ota8eat<;) rather than dignity (Bp. 1, PG 91. 364A). He also contrasts the blessed ones 
like prefect George, in whom the firm love for God has taken root in the depth of their 
souls, with those who prefer material things, whose disposition ( Ota8eat<;) is not fixed 
but is subject to change (PG 91. 364B-365A). He then writes the following: 'Nothing of 
what exists, my blessed master, can divert you from the good and deifying habit (e~t<;) 
that accompanies your intention (yVWflfJ) on your way towards God' (PG 91. 365B). We 
encounter here three keywords in Maximus' vocabulary-ota8eat<;, £~1<;, and YVWflTJ-
which often occur together in his oeuvre. The first of them, 8ta8ecnc;, can be translated 
in a straightforward manner as 'disposition. The second, £~1<;, is a noun derived from 
the Greek word 'to have' (like its Latin counterpart habitus), indicating an acquired 
state or pattern of behaviour. The third term, yv<.Of!fJ, has even more shades of meaning 
(opinion, choice, disposition of willing) in addition to the translation 'intention'; in fact, 
this is the word that Maximus used to differentiate the deliberative 'gnomic will' from 
the stable 'natural will' (as part of his intellectual battle with the monothelite heresy). 
In cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), one encounters a similar stress on habits or 
behavioural patterns with which are connected opinions and automatic thoughts. 
534 MICHAEL BAKKER 
In his letter Maximus also mentions the 'depth of the soul' (PG 91. 385C) and the 
'hidden part of the heart' (PG 91. 38oB). These are notions one finds in other parts 
of his writings as well and they suggest a parallel with depth psychology. The name 
of this type of psychology suggests a realm below, and is often associated with the 
notion of the unconscious, and the sexual and aggressive drives of a human being. 
The name that comes to mind in this context is of course that of psychiatrist Sigmund 
Freud (1856-1939), who is often associated with the term 'subconscious', although he 
himself preferred 'unconscious: In his topology of the soul he positions the drives in 
the id, below the ego. The spatial metaphor is taken up by Kallistos Ware, who criti-
cizes Freudian psychoanalysis for guiding us 'not to the "ladder that leads to the king-
dom", but to the staircase that goes down to a dank and snake-infested cellar' (Ware 
1996: 56). The term 'unconscious', however, leaves room for a realm above; in fact, this 
was proposed by the Romanian theologian Dumitru Staniloae (1903-93), who dis-
cerned within the unconscious a 'supraconscious: This is the 'room upstairs, where 
superior powers are stored and function, ready to flood the conscious life and even 
the subconscious, with their cleansing power, when we offer them the [right] condi-
tions' (Staniloae 2002: 98). Although he does not refer to it, Staniloae, as a student 
of Maximus, must have read the Confessor's response to the question of his friend 
Thalassius about the upper room where the Last Supper was held. Typically, Maximus 
gives this room a deeper sense: it is 'the large and spacious understanding (<'5tavota) 
and the familiarity with knowledge ( yvwmc;) embellished with divine visions of mys-
tical and ineffable doctrines' ( Q. Thal. 3, Laga-Steel198o: 59). So there appears to be a 
hidden part of the heart below and above. 
Using the spatial metaphor we could say that, along the horizontal axis, we will com-
pare Maxim us' practical advice on handling thoughts and developing good habits with 
a modern cognitive( -behavioural) therapist's down-to-earth treatment of behavioural 
problems. Since it will not be possible to give an in-depth description of CBT, I will use 
as main reference for this type of psychotherapy, Ancient Christian Wisdom and Aaron 
Beck's Cognitive Therapy: A Meeting of Minds (Trader 2011; reviewed in Bakker 2012). 
Because over the last thirty years there has appeared 'an abundance of treatment out-
come studies demonstrating CBT's efficacy for most forms of psychopathology includ-
ing anxiety disorders, depression, eating disorders, schizophrenia, personality disorders 
and more' (Boswell et al. 2011: 107), this form of short-term psychotherapy is widely 
applied nowadays and preferred by insurance companies. Classical psychoanalysis, as 
developed by Freud, on the other hand, involves many sessions over a longer period 
and is less and less applied. This is not necessarily the case for other schools of depth 
psychology that we will look at, when we explore the vertical axis. In general, the psy-
chodynamic approach (another name for depth psychology) has less empirical support 
than CBT, because, '[h] istorically, psychodynamic research focussed primarily upon the 
intensive study of individual patients (i.e., the case study) instead of large-scale trials' 
(Boswell et al. 2011: 103). 
Before tracing the background of Maximus' psychology, which precedes the sec-
tions dealing with the two parallels, we have to look at the methodological difficulty 
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of comparing thinkers who lived in different ages and under totally different circum-
stances. While for modern humanity the devil is perhaps merely a figure of speech, 
Maximus interprets King Nebuchadnezzar ofBabylon in Jeremiah 34 (LXX= TM Jer. 27) 
as the devil ( Q. Thal. 26, Laga-Steel198o: 173). Moreover, he speaks about him as a 
real person, who has an intention ( )'VWflfl) in line with sinners who willingly abandon 
God to pursue pleasure (Laga-Steel198o: 175); God allows him and his demons to 
tempt us, as he did with Job. 'The demons either tempt us themselves or arm against us 
those who have no fear of the Lord. They tempt us themselves when we withdraw from 
human society, as they tempted the Lord in the desert' (Car. 2. 13, Ceresa-Gastaldo 
1963: 94; Palmer et al. 1981: 67). Maximus interprets the helpers given by God to the 
king of Babylon as demons who attack humans according to their specialization in 
evil ( Q. Thal. 26, Laga-Steel198o: 181). Elsewhere, he lists the three main thoughts 
(A.oyt<rflol} of'gluttony, avarice, and self-esteem' (Car. 3. 56, Ceresa-Gastaldo 1963: qo; 
Palmer et al. 1981: 92). From these are born, respectively, unchastity, greed, and pride. 
'All the rest-the thoughts of anger, resentment, rancor, listlessness, envy, back-
biting, and so on-are consequent upon one of these three. These passions (na811), 
then, tie the intellect ( voi.\c;) to material things and drag it down to earth.' The terms 
'thoughts' (A.oyL<rflol) and 'intellect' ( voi.\c;), and the linking of demons to specific pas-
sions, remind one of Evagrius of Pontus, to whom Maximus owes many of his psy-
chological insights. In Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early 
Christianity, Brakke says the following: 
[T] o read Evagrius's demonology as an ancient and highly perceptive anticipation of 
modern psychology, as tempting as that might be, would be to attribute to Evagrius 
notions of repression, sublimation, and unconscious motives that he did not have. 
Still, we may understand that his strategies of naming thoughts, identifying the 
demons, and observing and analysing their methods gave monks a vocabulary and 
set of strategies that enabled them, in our terms, to talk about their feelings and to 
analyse them from a distance. 
(Brakke 2oo6: 77) 
Repression as the blocking of painful memories, such as sexual abuse during child-
hood, is a modern notion that seems indeed not to be part of Maximus' psychol-
ogy. In that sense his world differs much from that after Freud, who was described 
in 1939 by W. H. Auden thus: 'to us he is no more a person /now but a whole cli-
mate of opinion I under whom we conduct our different lives' (Auden 1976: 217). 
Were Maximus alive today, he would probably not dismiss a patient's struggle with 
demons as a mere metaphor or hallucination, as a post-Kantian psychologist might 
be inclined to do, but take it seriously as a real assault by the devil and pray for 'an 
angel sent by God' ( Q. Thal. 52, Laga-Steel198o: 425) to dispel the attacks. Maxim us 
would probably find it odd that a curer of souls is anxious not to move beyond the 
frontiers of the phenomena into the noetic realm, a 'hidden world' (Bp. 1, PG 91. 
389C) perceived by the nous, the spiritual or intuitive intellect ( voi.\c;), rather than 
the logos or discursive reason (A.Oyoc;). (I return to the psychic instruments vouc; and 
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A.6yoc; in the next section.) Actually, Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), father of another 
school of depth psychology (analytical psychology), saw the death of metaphysics 
precipitated by Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) as a reason to move from futile specu-
lation about objects outside our human experience to one's self (Bakker 2012: 82). 
Moreover, Nicolaus (2011) shows that even the Weltanschauung of two men living 
in the same age and on the same continent-earl Jung and Nikolai Berdyaev-may 
differ sharply. Since a human being with his or her thoughts, feelings, and longings 
basically functions the same as 1,400 years ago, it seems worthwhile to compare 
Maxim us' analysis to that of modern psychologists. 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL, ANTHROPOLOGICAL, 
AND MYSTAGOGICAL BACKGROUND 
The introduction has shown that psychology is closely bound up with epistemology and 
anthropology. In this section we will attempt to draw with rough strokes the intellectual 
and spiritual habitat of Maxim us and identify his sources. 
As the first source for Maxim us' psychology, his own experience must be mentioned.' 
The Centuries on Love reveal an intimate knowledge about the workings of the human 
soul born from intense training (acrK'latc;) in praxis and contemplation (8ewpla). In 
his Mystagogy, he refers to the things 'mystically contemplated' by his unnamed spir-
itual elder (yepwv, Myst. Prol., Boudignon 2011: 4), but it is obvious that he is intimately 
acquainted with his subject. In Q. Thal. 6o he spea:ks with authority about two types of 
knowledge of which the latter is gained by experience: 
The scriptural Word knows of two kinds of knowledge of divine things. On the one 
hand there is relative knowledge, rooted only in reason and concepts ( vo~ f!UOlV), and 
lacking in the kind of experiential perception ( a'la8'latV) of what one knows through 
active engagement; such relative knowledge is what we use to order our affairs in our 
present life. On the other hand there is that truly authentic knowledge, gained only 
by actual experience, apart from reason or concepts, which provides a total percep-
tion of the known object through participation by grace. 
(Laga-Steel1990: 77; trans. Bradshaw 2004: 192) 
Bradshaw quotes this passage to illustrate how Maximus interprets Ps-Dionysius the 
Areopagite, 'the all-holy and truly divine interpreter' (Myst. Prol., Boudignon 2011: 4), 
who in his Mystical Theology sees the ascent of Moses up Mt. Sinai as the movement into 
the 'darkness of unknowing' (Theol.myst. 1. 3, Heil-Ritter 1991: 144). So for Maximus the 
'truly authentic knowledge' is beyond concepts and knowing; this mystical knowledge 
1 See Louth 1996: 25 on the Macarian Homilies as inspiration for the importance Maximus attributes 
to experience. See also Miquel1966 on experience and Maximus' epistemology. 
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is therefore not subject to objective scientific scrutiny.' Concerning the 'split between 
scientific and religious knowledge', Hardy observes: 
As a source of knowledge, mysticism is of course in opposition to the scientific 
mode-the empirical, testable, provable knowledge which is the currency of the 
modern Western world. Freud, Jung and Assagioli [the founder of the school of psy-
chosynthesis], all medical doctors, trained in the scientific method, had to mainta~n 
the validity of their work against such opposition as that ofKarl Popper and th~ cnt-
icism of 'closed systems' theory, and still are hardly ~e~arded as r~spectab~e m the 
university system. Jung and Assagioli had the added disadv~tage of drawmg on a 
spiritual awareness which they regarded as fundamental to their work. 
(Hardy1987: no) 
Dionysius is among the limited number of sources Maximus mentions by name. An 
important quarry for his anthropology and psychology is Nemesius of ~mesa's On the 
Nature of Man. While Nemesius explicitly names and compares the views of ~ale~, 
Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics, and other ancient authors, Maximus tacitly quotes h1m m 
extenso (Amb.Io. 10:44, PG 91. 1196C-1197D; Louth 1996: 148-50 ). The frequent use 
of the term e~tc; (see my introduction to this chapter) seems to have been inspired by 
reading Aristotle himself or a work other than On the Nature of Man. Another source, 
besides the already-mentioned Evagrius, which Maximus does not name, are the 
Macarian homilies (in whatever guise Maximus knew them). 'Maximus has used the 
Macarian understanding of the place of the heart to balance the primacy of the intel-
lect found in Evagrius. This gives his anthropology a far more holistic quality. He has 
grounded Evagrian spirituality in the earth of a Macarian heart' (Plested 2004: ;42); 
The term 'heart' is perhaps even more intangible and immeasurable than the word soul 
('\fux~) to modern academic psychologists. Central for Maximus remains human expe-
rience; in order to describe it, he eclectically uses sources and feels free to adapt concepts 
if needed. 
In the quotation about the two types of knowledge above, Maxim us uses .the wor~ 
'perception' (a'(cr8'1atc;) in a positive sense, under the influence. of the ~acana.n tradi-
tion it seems (see Plested 2004: 236-7). In passages dealing w1th ascetic ~rax~s, ho~­
ever, Maximus presents a'(a8'1crtc; and atcr8~aetc; (senses) mostly in a negative hght: hls 
advice, for example, is to shut the senses (fluO'ac; -rac; atae~cretc;, Q. Thal. 49, Laga-Steel 
1980: 357) when the passions revolt. Typically, Maximus' approach is not to declare the 
latter type of a'(a8'1atc; as bad per se, but to locate the tension b.etween the :':o types at 
the level of intellect (vouc;): 'When the intellect turns its attention to the vlSlble world, 
it perceives things through the medium of the senses in a way that accords wi~h nature. 
And the intellect is not evil, nor is its natural capacity to form conceptual1mages 0: 
things, nor are the things themselves, nor are the senses, for all are the work of God 
2 Cf. Uleman 2005 : 5: '[T]he psychoanalytic unconscious is widely acknowledged to be a fail~re as a 
scientific theory because evidence of its major comp~nents cannot b.e obse,rved, measured prectsely, or 
manipulated easily. The theory's complexity renders 1t largely unfalstfiable. 
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(Car. 2. 15, Ceresa-Gastaldo 1963: 96; trans. Palmer et al. 1981: 67). It all depends on the 
proper use (xp~at<;) 3 of the soul's natural powers and whether 'sense (a'Lcr8f]atv) is enno-
bled by reason' (KaTa A.Oyov, Amb.Io. 10: 3, PG 91. m6D; Louth 1996: 102).ln that case it 
is possible to discern the distinctly Maximian logoi of Creation (see Louth 2010): 
If the soul uses [xp~crarro] the senses properly, discerning by means of its own facul-
ties the manifold inner principles (A6youc;) of created beings, and if it succeeds in 
wisely transmitting to itself the whole visible universe in which God is hidden and 
proclaimed in silence, then by use of its own free choice [npoa(pwt<;] it creates a 
world of spiritual beauty within the understanding [ 8u.'tvota ]. 
(Amb.Io. 21, PG 91. 1248C; trans. Cooper 2005: 59) 
In Ambiguum 10 Maxim us explains that intellect, reason, and sense correspond to three 
motions of the soul and these bring him to one of his favourite triads: that ofbeing, well-
being, and eternal being. The two ways of being at the extremes are God's alone, while 
the middle one (well-being) depends on 'our inclination (yVWf.lfJ) and motion' (Amb. 
Io. 10: 3, PG 91. 1112D-1116B; trans. Louth 1996: 100-2). Here we encounter again the 
term YVWf.l'l already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. This section of the 
Ambiguum alludes to the mediating role played by human beings between the sensible 
and the intelligible Creation (that is, the fourth division ofbeing, on which see Thunberg 
1995: 39-404). This suggests an upward motion towards the soul's cause, God, with the 
soul 'learning by sense (aicr8~cret)' from below and 'grasping by intellection (vo~cret)' 
from above (Opusc. de anima, PG 91. 353D). 
Perception by the senses ( aicr8~cret<;) is situated at the border between body and soul, 
and this takes us to the body. As with perception ( a'Lo8f]at<;), the sense organs ( aio8~oet<;, 
the term Maxim us prefers to aicr8fJT~pta) and the body in general are by nature good in 
Maximus' view; it all depends on how we use them. 'When [the soul] joins this trans-
formed sensual operation on the one hand with the practice of virtue on the other, the 
whole soul/body composite becomes an agent of divine theophany' (Cooper 2005: 59; 
see Amb.Io. 21, PG 91. 1249C). Maximian anthropology follows Evagrius in substituting 
spirit ( nveiif!a) with intellect ( voii<;) in Paul's trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit (see 
Thunberg 1995: 107-13). The fourth chapter of the Mystagogy, entitled 'How ·and in what 
manner the holy church of God symbolically represents humankind and how it is rep-
resented by him as human: explains how we should picture the intellect as the supreme 
organ of the soul and thus of a human being (Myst.4, Boudignon 2011: 4). 
What then is the place of reason (A6yoc;)? For Maximus, reason is the soul's organ 
for discursive reasoning. It is subservient to the intuitive and spiritual intellect (voii<;): 
'A pure intellect sees things correctly. A trained reason4 puts them in order' (Car. 2.97, 
Palmer et al. 1981: 82). Maxim us gives a more elaborate answer about the functioning of 
the pair in the following chapter of the Mystagogy, where he associates intellect with the 
3 See Bradshaw 2004: 3, where he discusses the use of XP~crtc; , e~L<;, and EVEpywx by Plato and Aristotle. 
4 Palmer et al. 1981 consistently translate logos as 'intelligence: I have modifed the translation by 
changing all instances of 'intelligence' to 'reason'. 
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contemplative power (8ewpfJTLK6v) and reason with the active power (npaKTLKOV) of the 
soul. The essences of intellect and reason need to manifest themselves progressively in, 
respectively, truth and goodness. The 'habit of contemplation' (8ewpfJTLK~ e~t<;) and the 
'habit of action' (npaKTLK~ e~t<;) provide stability to the soul in its progression towards 
deification (Myst. 4, Boudignon 2011: 20-1). 
Besides its association with voii<; and a'(o8f)at<;, logos in its sense of reason is associ-
ated with another group of three, that of reason, anger (8uf!6<;), and desire ( ern8uf!la) 
(e.g. Q. Thal. 5, Laga-Steel198o: 65). More often Maximus refers to these psychic pow-
ers as 'desiring' (ern8Uf.lfJTLKov), 'incensive' (8Uf!LKov), and 'rational' (.AoytcrTLKov). This 
tripartite division of the soul was formulated by Plato (Republic iv: 434D-441C) and on 
the whole accepted by the Greek Fathers (see Palm er et al. 1981: 380 ). The use of these 
natural-and therefore in Maximus' view fundamentally good-powers depends on a 
person's disposition: 'A soul's motivation is rightly ordered when its desiring power is 
subordinated to self-control, when its incensive power rejects hatred and cleaves to love, 
and when the power of reason, through prayer and spiritual contemplation, advances 
towards God' (Car. 4. 15, Ceresa-Gastaldo 1963: 200; trans. Palmer et al.1981: 102). 
Plato's tripartite soul is part of a comparison between city and soul: 'But now the city 
was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own 
function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain affections (na8f)) and 
habits (e~et<;) 5 of these three kinds' (Republic, iv: 435B, trans. Shorey 1963: 377 ). Maxim us 
uses the same metaphor when he compares Nineveh to the soul:6 
. .. the soul of each and every person to which, in its transgression, the word of God is 
sent preaching repentance unto life (cf. Jon 3:1-4). In turn we may interpret the king 
of that city, or soul, as the intellect (vou<;) and its captains as the soul's innate facul-
ties. The men, then, signify impassioned thoughts (Aoytaf.LOU<;), the cattle movements 
of the desiring faculty in relation to the body, the oxen covetous functions of the 
incensive faculty towards material objects, and the sheep the attempts of the senses 
to grasp sensible objects without intelligent reflection. So too the king is the intellect 
that arises, as from its throne, from the habitude ( e~L<;) born of its former ignorance. 
( Q.1hal. 64, Laga-Steel1990: 207; trans. Blowers-Wilken 2003: 155) 
The intellect thus rules, or should rule, over its three psychic powers as a king corn-
mands his captains. Thunberg (1995: 260) discusses this arrangement in relation to the 
competing (and more Evagrian) set-up, where the intellect is closely associated with the 
rational power and thus a colleague of the ern8Uf.lfJTLKov and the 8uf!LKov. 
To conclude this section, I would like to point to the mystagogical habitat from 
within which Maximus writes. This involves offering to God the correction of trans-
gressions 'through true worship-! mean a humble disposition (8La8eot<;)' (Q.Thal. 26, 
Laga-Steel 1980: 177). In its progression towards deification and mystical union, 
s Shorey 1963: 377 n.(c), notes that: 'e~EL<; is here almost the Aristotelian e~tc;: 
6 Palmer's translation of vouc; as 'the psychic powers' (Palm er et al. 1981) has been modified to 
'intellect'. Italics indicate quotations from Jonah 3; I have added in brackets the key Greek words. 
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the soul passes through the three spiritual stages described in, amongst others, the 
Mystagogy: 'By means of the nave, representing the body, it proposes ethicatphilos-
ophy, while by means of the sanctuary, representing the soul, it spiritually interprets 
natural contemplation, and by means of the intellect of the divine altar it manifests 
mystical theology' (Myst. 4, Boudignon 2011: 4). 
THE HORIZONTAL AXIS: 
COGNITIVE THERAPY 
In this section we will look at the parallels between Maxim us' psychology and cognitive 
therapy. This does not involve deep mysticism with the intellect soaring beyond matter 
and reasoning, but rather the disciplined application of reason to one's own thoughts, 
opinions, and habits. Here one sees that Maximus and cognitive therapy mirror an 
ancient example: 'modern cognitive therapy has many things in common with Stoic 
therapy' (Sorabji 2ooo: 2). 
It is part of the basic ascetical handiwork that is performed during the stages of ethical 
philosophy and natural contemplation mentioned in the previous section. We already saw 
that the soul needs its reasoning power to assess what the senses suggest to it. This pro-
cess Maximus describes to Thalassius, who asks how to interpret King Hezeldah blocldng 
off the water from the springs outside Jerusalem (2 Chr. 32: 2-4, Q. Thai. 49, Laga-Steel 
1980: 351). His answer is that the spri~gs should be interpreted as the senses, which should 
be closed when under demonic attack (see previous ~ection). This is, of course, a very dras-
tic response, like literally shutting yourself in your monastic cell.7 Fortunately, his answer 
also describes how the psyche normally processes stimuli from 6utside. As was the case 
with Nineveh, the city is interpreted as the soul and the ldng as its spiritual intellect ( vou<;). 
Maxim us identifies the three court officials as the three psychic powers. He describes how 
the soul produces knowledge out of sensible and intelligible input: 
The waters from outside the city-that is, outside the soul__.:. which formed the river 
flowing through the city are the concepts (vo~f!aTa) that, in the course of natural 
contemplation, are conveyed from the sensible object through every one of the 
senses and stream into the soul. By these waters, or notions, reason (A.oyo<;) passes 
like a river through the city of the soul and achieves the knowledge of sensible things. 
( Q.Ihal., Laga-Steel1990: 355-6; trans. Blowers 1991: 175) 
This image implies that the king should keep watch over what enters his city, if he does 
not completely restrict the 'stream of consciousness' (to use a phrase from literary 
7 I used this while working as a chaplain with a prisoner struggling with his alcohol addiction. I 
suggested he shut off his television set, instead of being bombarded with images of people drinking happily, 
when his demons attacked him during the long evenings in his prison cell. Using Maxim us' metaphor, I 
asked him who was sitting on the throne of his city, which made him thi~k very deeply. 
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criticism). This watchfulness (v~\jll<;) is described repeatedly by neptic Fathers such 
as Maximus.8 It requires a rational and dispassionate attitude to detect and repel 
impassioned thoughts suggested by the devil. Elsewhere, however, Maximus seems 
to suggest that the danger is not only outside and that the king needs the impartial 
advice of the power of reason (A.oytcrnKov) to prevent him from becoming enam-
oured with his own thoughts. Moreover, sometimes he needs to call in an advisor 
from outside the city: 
Just as parents have a special affection for the children who are the fruit of their bod-
ies, so the intellect naturally clings to its own thoughts. And just as to passionately 
fond parents their own children seem the most capable and most beautiful of all-
though they may be the most ridiculous in every way-so to a foolish intellect its 
own thoughts appear the most intelligent of all, though they may be utterly degraded. 
The wise man does not regard his own thoughts in this way. It is precisely when he 
feels convinced that they are true and good he most distrusts his own judgment. He 
makes other wise men the judges of his own thoughts and arguments. 
(Car. 3. 58, Ceresa-Gastaldo 1963: 2oo; trans. Palmer et al. 1981: 92) 
Judgements about thoughts may be coloured by a high opinion about oneself, but also 
by the opinions of others and private opinions about other people and things. This tru-
ism is at the heart of cognitive therapy: 'The basic concept in the cognitive model affirms 
that the way people feel and behave stems not from a situation in itself, but from the way 
in which they interpret or construe that situation' (Trader 2011: 51). This suggests a par-
allel with Maximus' terms 'intention' or 'opinion' (yvc.bf.l'l) and 'disposition' (oux8ecrt<;), 
because we interpret similar situations in a similar way, and because our views and atti-
tudes tend to be surprisingly stable. 
As already said in my introduction, Maximus often uses the term 'habit' (e~L<;) when 
speaking of yvc.bf.l'l and Ota8ecrt<;.9 Habits seem to be short -cuts in the full process of will-
ing which consists, according to Maxim us, of more than ten steps a human being has 
to go through if he or she is to act fully rationally. The term 8ta8ecrt<; occurs as one of 
the steps of the process of willing which Maxim us describes to the deposed patriarch 
Pyrrhus during their theological disputation: 'This is called the faculty of will of the 
rational soul. It is according to this that we consider when willing, and in considering, 
we wish what we will. And when willing, we also inquire, examine, deliberate, judge, 
are disposed towards, choose, initiate, and use' (DP, PG 91. 293B-C). I would say that 
a habit (e~L<;) sldps the steps of inquiry, examination, deliberation, and judgement, and 
goes straight to disposition ( 8ta8ecrt<;) or rather choice (of means: n:poa[pecrt<;). 
Habits suggest unconscious processes taldng place without a person really being 
aware of them, for example shifting gear while driving a car. While 'the psychoanalytic 
8 Cf. the full title of the Philokalia, in which Maxim us takes up more space than any of the other 
authors in this collection. 
9 Aristotle, in whose virtue ethics habit plays an important role, says in the fourth book of his 
Metaphysics that one of the senses ofE~u; is 15La8wu; (Ross 1958: vol.1, 1022b). 
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unconscious is, to most laypeople and those in the arts and the humanities, the 
only unconscious: Uleman (2005: 4) compared its 'primary metaphor of a-hydraulic 
system with various fluid (drives, energy) seeking discharge (pleasure) and being chan-
neled or blocked by defenses or sublimations' to the metaphor of a computer associated 
with the 'cognitive unconscious: The latter concept of the unconscious was introduced 
in 1987 in an essay by Kihlstrom describing: 
[T]he ways in which the computer as metaphor formed the basis for increasingly com-
plex conceptions of human mental processes ... Unlike the psychoanalytic uncon-
scious, it has no innate drives that seek gratification without regard to constraints 
of reality and society. In fact it is rather cold, apparently rational, and amotivational, 
compared to the heat and irrationality of psychoanalytic drives and conflicts. 
(Uleman 2005: 5) 
How then to adjust faulty ('maladaptive') thinking and habits? The answer of cognitive 
therapy is to become aware of your trains of thought by a cold analysis as if you were a 
computer programme: 
In cognitive theory, metacognition refers to 'thought about a thought' in which a per-
son examines and evaluates his personal theories and hypotheses about himself, oth-
ers, and his world, thereby regulating his core schemata, assumptions, and rules. Beck 
views metacognition as a cognitive system designed to consciously control and some-
times override primitive thinking that characterizes the rest of the animal kingdom. 
(Trader 2011: 109) 
Consciousness of a hidden opinion and its accompanying thoughts and feelings comes 
about when a client forces him- or herself-or rather is forced by the therapist-to 
analyse hidden inner processes. The most important step in becoming conscious of 
one's 'schemata' is probably the decision to go into therapy, that is, the realization that 
one needs help. 
The Greek word that comes closest to being an equivalent of consciousness is to my 
mind auvalaOT]aL<;, related to the term a'(aOT]at<; discussed above. Galen, Aristotle, and 
Nemesius use it in a medical context (suffering from a naOoc;), and Plotinus in the sense 
of self-awareness. The attacks of demons and the suffering from involuntary (aKm)ata) 
misfortunes lead according to Maximus to auvalaOT]O'L<;, as does becoming aware of 
one's previous mistakes and accepting 'voluntarily ( eJ<oualwc;) the yoke of the king of 
Babylon' ( Q. 7hal. 26, Laga-Steel198o: 177 ). 
To conclude this section, it is good to remind ourselves of the goal of our ascetic 
endeavours: love, defined by Maxim us as 'a good disposition ( 8ta0eat<;) of the soul' (Car. 
1. 1). It is the result of obeying the scriptural law (associated with natural contempla-
tion, the second spiritual stage), which turns 'fear (of punishment) into a disposition 
( 8ta0eat<;) slowly but surely strengthened by deliberate willing ( yvw~T]) of the good. It 
turns their customary behaviour into a (permanent) habitude ( e~t<;) purged by the for-
getting of their former ways, and simultaneously engenders the love of others' ( Q. 7hal. 
64, Laga-Steel1990: 235; trans. Blowers-Wilken 2003: 168). 
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THE VERTICAL AXIS: DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY 
AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 
···················································································································································································· 
Let us start this section with an example of consciousness ( auva[a0T]O'L<;) that is the 
result of an experience belonging to the third and final spiritual stage, that of mystical 
theology: 
When the intellect is ravished through love by divine knowledge and stands outside 
the realm of created beings, it becomes aware of God's infinity. It is then, according 
to Isaiah, that a sense of amazement mal<es it conscious of its own lowliness and in all 
sincerity it repeats the prophet's words: How abject I am, for I am pierced to the heart; 
because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell among a people of unclean lips; and my 
eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts (Isa. 6: 5). 
(Car. 1: 12, Ceresa-Gastaldo 1963: 54; trans. Palmer et al.1981: 54) 
The psychologist Abraham Maslow (1908-70) would probably identify this as a 'peak 
experience: He, along with William James (1842-1910) and the already mentioned 
Roberto Assagioli, were pioneers of what is now called transpersonal psychology 
(Rowan 2005: 27-47). The ideas of Maslow, such as his 'hierarchy of needs: have been 
criticized for their lack of scientific rigour. Why then do his and other more 'esoteric' 
theories appeal to the modern human being, who also tries to be a rational creature? 
To my mind, this apparent schizophrenia stems from a deep desire not be irrational but 
rather to be 'hyperrational: to use the favourite prefix hyper (beyond) of Ps-Dionysius 
the Areopagite. Mystical theology, the 'darkness of unknowing: beyond reason (A6yoc;) 
and even intellect ( vouc;), beckons. It seems natural to associate this 'darkness of 
unknowing' with the 'supraconscious' mentioned in my introduction. Assagioli also 
calls it the 'superconscious' or 'higher unconscious': 'From this region we receive our 
higher intuitions and inspirations-artistic, philosophical or scientific, ethical "impera-
tives" and urges to humanitarian and heroic action' (Assagioli 1980: 17). Using the term 
'heart' of the Macarian tradition, also used by Maximus instead of vouc; (see Q. 7hal. 5, 
Laga-Steel198o: 65), the modern yepwv Kallistos Ware gives the following description: 
The heart includes what we today tend to describe as 'the unconscious: The heart, 
that is to say, includes those aspects of myself which I do not as yet understand, the 
potentialities within myself of which I am at present largely unaware ... we may say 
that the heart is open both below and above, to the abyss of the subconscious below; 
above, to the abyss of mystical supraconscious, below to the forces of evil; above, to 
the Divine Light. 
(cited in Nicolaus 2011: 24) 
If we combine this with Maxim us' interpretation of the Last Supper's upper room, also 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, we end up with a house with a cellar and 
an attic as a metaphor for the soul with, respectively, its lower and higher unconscious. 
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While Ware has a negative view of the cellar, Staniloae, in a typically Maximian fashion, 
does not regard the lower unconscious as evil by nature. The energies below, however, 
need to be balanced by the forces of the 'upper room of the soul: By calling them 'psychic 
energies of desire and anger' he makes a tacit reference to the bn8uf.urnK6v and 8Uf.UK6v 
(Staniloae 2002: 100 ). 
Ware referred to the subconscious and superconscious within human beings as 
abysses. Similarly, Maxim us compares the abyss of the intellect ( vov<;) to the abyss of 
God in Amb.Io., where he explains a passage from Gregory Nazianzen quoting Psalm 
41: 8 (LXX = TM 42: 7) ('Abyss calls to abyss in the noise of your cataracts'): 
Every intellect ( voii<;), because of its invisible nature and the depth and multitude of 
its thoughts, is to be compared to an abyss, since it passes beyond the ordered array of 
the phenomena and comes to the place of intelligible reality. Or again, when in faith 
by the vehemence of its movement it passes beyond what is fitting, and comes to rest 
in itself, in every way fixed and unmoved, because it has passed beyond everything, 
then it necessarily calls upon the divine wisdom, which to the understanding is really 
and truly the unfathomable abyss. 
(Amb.Io. 71, PG 91. 1408D-1409A; trans. Louth 1996: 164) 
While there is no equivalent for the psychoanalytic unconscious in Maximus, one might 
see a parallel in ignorance. On the one hand, it is clearly a sin: 'The darkness of ignorance 
and the unimaginable depth of evil have come over human nature like an abyss, and the 
mountains of error-meaning "the spirits of wickedness" (Eph. 6: 12)-have rooted them-
selves on it: ( Q. Thal. 64, Laga-Steel1990: 193; Blowers-Wilken 2003: 148). On the other 
hand, we have the darkness of unknowing which Maxim us associates with the latest stage 
of spiritual life, mystical theology. 
MAXIMUS IN DIALOGUE WITH 
MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 
........ ... ............ ................. .. ................... ....... ........... .................. .... .... ...... .............. .............................. ............. ... ......... 
Imagine ifMaximus the Confessor were to visit our present world and age.10 At first, he 
would undoubtedly be in awe of the technological progress, the advances in medicine, 
etc. He would probably avidly read handbooks of neuropsychology, cognitive therapy, 
and the behavioural sciences, the successors of Nemesius' On the Nature of Man, and 
draw from them useful insights and techniques. His basic view of the human being's 
inner cosmos and his place in the macro-cosmos, however, would probably stay the 
same. Becoming more acquainted with the modern human being, he would probably be 
appalled by the little spiritual progress made, the addictions and depressions, despite all 
10 For a similar thought experiment involving Plato, see Assagioli 2002: 3-4. 
MAXIMUS AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 545 
the affluence available. As Paul did on the Areopagus, he would perhaps try to adapt his 
language to appeal to an audience not well versed in the Old and New Testaments, blind 
to symbolism, and ignorant of his mystagogical habitat. His pedagogical style, however, 
would probably also stay the same, attempting to draw the other into the mystery of the 
logoi of Creation. Rather than Maxim us descending into polemics as with the deposed 
patriarch Pyrrhus, I imagine him more than willing to address questions and engage in a 
dialogue with modern psychology. Many topics remain to be explored: his teaching about 
the human will, the personal logos of a human being and how to discern it, and his lists 
ofAoyLOf.!OVm18T] in relation to the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association 2013), to name but a few. 
SuGGESTED READING 
A fundamental work on Maximian psychology remains Thunberg 1995. The various schools of 
modern psychology have produced a plethora of books. Browsing through DSM-s (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013) gives an impression of psychopathology according to a coalition 
of mental health professionals, insurers, and the pharmaceutical industry. Hardy 1987 is recom-
mended as a guide to a type of psychology that has a more holistic view of human beings that is 
more compatible with Maxim us' teachings. Cooper 2005, Nicolaus 2011, Trader 2011, Chirban 
2012, and Bakker 2013 are examples of attempts to bring modern psychology into dialogue with 
the church Fathers. 
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